Download e-book for kindle: A Simple Game-Theoretic Approach to Suppression of Enemy by Richard Mesic Thomas Hamilton, RAND

By Richard Mesic Thomas Hamilton, RAND

ISBN-10: 0833032593

ISBN-13: 9780833032591

Uncomplicated video game thought is used to narrate U.S. Air strength operations to their likey results on enemy habit.

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Extra resources for A Simple Game-Theoretic Approach to Suppression of Enemy Defenses and Other Time Critical Target Analyses

Example text

This integrated active defense parameter is included in our counterforce analyses because it can affect the optimal allocations of air assets to counterforce or to strike missions. 25 0 =1 =5 Vdamage = 10 Note: Outcomes reflect value from the Blue point of view. Red is assumed to have exactly opposite MoEs. 34 0403 R The results of this game can be described in the familiar two-by-two matrix that shows the expected value (to Blue) of each of the four strategy pairs. We can fill in the values of this game matrix by making plausible assumptions about the values of the input variables in the equation in the previous chart.

For the underlying parameters of the conflict, we have taken the numbers from the previous chart. The left chart illustrates Blue’s view of the conflict. Blue expects a high level of SAM engagement and is surprised that Red’s strategy is so conservative, firing only 20 percent of the time instead of the expected 71 percent of the time. The right chart illustrates Red’s view of the conflict. Red expects Blue to mainly conduct strike and is surprised that Blue devotes so many assets to SEAD. ” There is no straightforward way to use game theory or any other mathematical tool to predict what will happen in such a situation.

Suppose also that we develop and field a missile defense system capable of destroying 50 percent of missiles in flight. The game that would result from this combination of capabilities is as shown in the lower left-hand chart. Clearly, the resulting capability is not good. In this game, each time Red launches missiles it can be certain of a bad outcome for Blue. Hence, Red should launch missiles all of the time and it makes no difference whether or not Blue chooses to execute counterforce attacks; the outcome is always bad.

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A Simple Game-Theoretic Approach to Suppression of Enemy Defenses and Other Time Critical Target Analyses by Richard Mesic Thomas Hamilton, RAND

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